Property by Hargrave, Lee
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 53 | Number 3
Review of Recent Developments: 1991-1992
January 1993
Property
Lee Hargrave
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Lee Hargrave, Property, 53 La. L. Rev. (1993)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol53/iss3/13
Property
Lee Hargrave*
I. ACCESSION
A. Mineral and Timber Revenues as Fruits
In the past, as in Elder v. Ellerbe, cases tended to lump all income
from mineral development together and classify it all as a product rather
than a fruit. This was done with little discussion even though some of
the payments involved did not deplete the land and thus met the def-
inition of fruits.2 Bonuses and lease proceeds, for example, are paid in
return for granting a right to conduct operations. They are not contingent
on production and do not deplete the substance of the soil. Royalties
and other production payments, however, are paid upon removal of oil
and gas from the ground and are not fruits.3 Although the issue was
not discussed, the result in these old cases is supported by the view
that one should not benefit from transferring to another for a fee a
right to drill for products that one has no right to take in the first
place.
Succession of Doll v. Dol 4 departed from the older cases and more
precisely examined the nature of the mineral income involved to deter-
mine whether it was a fruit. The supreme court concluded that bonus
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Wex S. Malone Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914) (half of a certain bonus and of certain royalties
held not to be fruits); Gueno v. Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 117 So. 2d 817 (1960) (declaratory
judgment that the usufructuary of land had no right to lease the land for mineral
development); see Comment (a) to La. Civ. Code art. 551.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 551.
3. Although the text of Louisiana Civil Code article 2339 respects the classification
of bonuses and delay rentals as fruits in that it does not call them fruits, it treats them
as the functional equivalent of fruits in making them community property if produced
from the separate property of a spouse. As amended by 1980 La. Acts No. 565, Article
2339 treats all mineral proceeds the same; "minerals produced from or attributable to a
separate asset, and bonuses, delay rentals, royalties, and shut-in payments arising from
mineral leases" are community property unless the owner spouse has filed the appropriate
declaration. This is in contrast to the law prior to the amendment, which listed as within
the rule only non-depleting mineral revenues, namely, "bonuses, delay rentals, and shut-
in payments arising from mineral leases." See Katherine S. Spaht and W. Lee Hargrave,
Matrimonial Regimes § 3.8, at 53, in 16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1989).
4. 593 So. 2d 1239 (La. 1992).
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payments of $70,795 were paid in return for the right to drill on the
property and, thus, were fruits. Such "mineral interests which result in
the payment of bonuses ... do not so diminish the substance as to
amount to a partial alienation and are quite analogous to the rentals,
given as an example of 'civil fruits."' 5 The court also concluded that
a donee was required to collate only the land donated, and not the
fruits. 6 It would appear that the same approach would apply to pos-
sessors' and usufructuaries' rights to fruits.
7
o Doll was also an opportunity for the supreme court to clarify the
developing rule that some proceeds from timber operations are fruits.
Traditionally, revenues from the sale of timber were classified as products
or capital assets "on account of their slow growth and high value."'
However, cases and the comments to Louisiana Civil Code article 551
suggested that "trees in a tree farm or in a regularly exploited forest
may be regarded as fruits, because they are produced according to the
destination of the property and without diminution of its substance.''
Indeed, Louisiana Civil Code article 562 particularized that rule to
usufructs: "The proceeds of timber operations that are derived from
proper management of timberlands belong to the usufructuary."
The supreme court followed these suggestions and looked to whether
the funds received were compensation for seriously depleting the sub-
stance of the property. In Doll, the donee of the land obtained naturally
seeded forest and timberland. She hired a forestry consultant and, fol-
lowing his recommendations, engaged in selective thinning and planting
of new pine seedlings in the bulk of the open acreage. Revenues of
$73,000 from sales of timber were received, but she rejected a bid of
$103,000 to clear cut the remaining timber, "evidencing an intention to
manage the property to provide sustained income." 0 Justice Cole, writing
for the court, noted the criteria for the kinds of tree farming operations
that would result in fruits:
5. Id. at 1247 (citing Todd v. State Dept. of Nat. Resources, 474 So. 2d 430, 434
n.8 (La. 1985)).
6. Id. at 1256. See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1227-1288, 1559, 1569.
7. Doll does not purport to affect the provisions of the Mineral Code establishing
the very narrow authority of a usufructuary to grant a valid mineral lease on a tract of
land. See La. R.S. 31:192, 195 (1989). Ironically, even though only the naked owner can
validly lease the land for mineral development, now it appears that bonuses would go to
the usufructuary. This result would then parallel the provisions of La. RS. 31:190(B)
(1989) that apply to surviving spouses having usufructs. These spouses are entitled to the
mineral proceeds, whether mineral development causes depletion or not, but they cannot
validly lease the property for development without the consent of the naked owner. La.
R.S. 31:190(B) (as amended by 1986 La. Acts No. 245).
8. Comment (b) to La. Civ. Code art. 551.
9. Id.; Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 81 So. 769, 773-74 (La. 1919) (citing the
French authorities that a different rule would apply to trees "under regulated felling").
10. Doll v. Doll, 593 So. 2d 1239, 1249 (La. 1992).
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From the foregoing we determine designation as a "tree
farm" is premised upon the existence of management techniques
aimed at securing continuous production of timber, a conclusion
which comports with the principle of article 551 and comment
b thereto. It is clear a tree farm can not be defined by reference
to its character at the time of the growth, but rather by the
land's ability, through proper management techniques such as
selective thinnings and plantings, to provide sustained yields.
The timber sales at issue here were nothing more than selective
thinnings intended to spur a fruitful and continuous yield over
a prolonged stretch of time.'
B. Lessee's Crops
Read literally, Louisiana Civil Code article 493 would apply to
"plantings" made on the land of another with the owner's consent.
Thus, crops that had been planted before the lessee's rights ended would
be covered by the article, and, upon written demand of the landowner,
the lessee could remove his growing crop within 90 days of demand.
If not removed, the crop would then be owned by the landowner without
compensation to the lessee.
Dictum in Caballero Planting Co., Inc. v. Hymel 2 questions whether
this article, which poses problems of inequity even as to buildings, 3
would apply to crops. The first circuit court of appeal stated, "Initially,
we have doubts as to whether the legislature intended art. 493 to apply
to a crop such as sugarcane, .. . which has a growing season greatly
in excess of ninety days."'' 4 However, it found it unnecessary to face
that issue because it concluded that the landowner failed to make the
type of demand required by Article 493. The court found that a letter
from the landowner's attorney merely "advised" the lessee he could
remove his crops. It did not so "demand."'" The court reversed a
11. Id. at 1249-50.
12. 597 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992).
13. Symeon Symeonides, Property, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984, 45 La. L.
Rev. 541 (1984).
14. Hymel, 597 So. 2d at 37.
15. The language of the letter was,
Since Mr. Caballero no longer has the right to occupy my clients' property, as
per my letter of December 29, 1989, this is to advise that Mr. Caballero may
remove whatever improvements or plantings that belong to him which are located
on my clients' property; with the obligation to restore the property to its former
condition.
Please keep in mind, however, that if Mr. Caballero removes any im-
provements or plantings that do not belong to him, my clients will file suit for
damages.
1993]
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summary judgment in favor of the landowner as against the lessee's
claim for compensation for the plant sugar cane and stubble cane which
it had previously planted.
Even if a proper demand had been made under Article 493, serious
doubt remains as to the article's application to growing crops. Perhaps
landscape plantings or even timber might be covered under the article
since they do not normally produce fruits. But, the more specific code
articles governing fruits would seem to govern crops. Louisiana Civil
Code article 485 provides that if fruits belong to the owner of a thing
by accession but "are produced by the work of another person, or from
seeds sown by him, the owner may retain them on reimbursing such
person his expenses." In such a case, even if demand were made and
the lessee failed to remove the plant cane and stubble cane (a very
unlikely event) so that the landowner became owner of the crop and
then harvested it as a fruit, the former lessee would be entitled to
reimbursement of his own expenses. This is a basic equitable tenet of
the Civil Code, one so strong that even a possessor in bad faith is
entitled to such reimbursement. 6 The lessee who plants sugar cane, a
crop that takes so long to grow,' 7 with the knowledge and consent of
the landowner should at least be in as good a position as a bad faith
possessor.
C. Accession Rules v. Accession Policies
The tension between a general policy against unjust enrichment that
underlies the laws of accession and the specific rules of accession that
sometime produce a seemingly inequitable result appeared in Scott v.
Wesley.' 8 The first circuit court of appeal applied the clearly applicable
accession rules of the Louisiana Civil Code rather than trying to avoid
application of the rule under unjust enrichment policy notions.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 486.
17. Cultivation practices for sugar cane, with its long growing season, were described
in Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Walet, 225 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
The court explained:
To consider appellants' contentions, we must review the evidence concerning
the problems of cultivating and harvesting sugar cane. Sugar cane is a crop
that must be cultivated over a period of approximately fourteen months. It is
planted in August or early September and is not harvested until the end of
October, or in November and December of the following year. After harvesting,
the crop reappears for two successive seasons (stubble cane) and is harvested
in each of the two following years. Good farming practice allows three harvests
(plant, first year stubble, and second year stubble). In the fourth year, the land
is allowed to lie fallow, or is planted with peas or corn to enrich the soil for
future plantings of cane.
Id. at 80.
18. 589 So. 2d 26 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
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The builder of a shell home for Wesley obtained a judgment for
the contract price, but he was unable to collect on it. The house was
built on property owned by Wesley's mother-in-law, but Wesley sub-
sequently divorced his wife and apparently left the state. The mother-
in-law completed the house and moved in. The builder then sued her
under an unjust enrichment theory for the contract price of the shell
home. The lower court held for plaintiff; the court of appeal reversed.' 9
If the house was built without the consent of the mother-in-law, as
she testified, Article 493 governed, and she owned the house as soon
as it was built. Since Articles 494-497 do not provide compensation
from the landowner to a person in plaintiff's position, 20 it would seem
to follow that no compensation was due. Presumably the underlying
notion here is that a builder should be careful enough not to build on
the property of an owner whose consent is not obtained. Or, perhaps
if he contracts with another to build on land of a third person, the
builder should look to the contracting party for payment.
Indeed, the plaintiff apparently recognized that no compensation
was due under the law of accession and instead relied on the more
vague concept of unjust enrichment. In that regard, the court of appeal
found that he did not meet one element of the requirements for recovery
under that theory-he had another remedy available. The plaintiff had
recourse against the person who contracted with him. Indeed, he had
a judgment against that person, even if he had been unable to collect
on it.21
This approach of the first circuit court of appeal in Scott contrasts
with that of the third circuit in Beacham v. Hardy Outdoor Advertising.22
In Beacham, the builder constructed an advertising sign on plaintiff's
property under a contract with Onebane but without plaintiff's consent.
The court concluded that Article 493 applied; the sign was built without
the landowner's consent and was thus owned by the landowner. However,
the court also invoked unjust enrichment 23 and developed what it per-
ceived as an equitable solution not provided in the Code. If the plaintiffs
chose to keep the sign, they had to pay defendant's costs. Or, they
could give up their ownership of the sign and require defendants to
19. Id. at 27-28.
20. He was neither a person whose materials were used by another (Article 494), nor
a consensual builder (Article 495), nor a possessor (Articles 496-497).
21. Scott, 589 So. 2d at 28.
22. 520 So. 2d 1086 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
23. Id. at 1089. The court cited as authority a passage from the Expose des Motifs
written by the drafters of the property law revision. That excerpt provided, in explaining
Articles 494-498: "These provisions are based on considerations of equity and fairness to
all concerned. They may be regarded in part as applications of the principle that forbids
unjust enrichment." 1979 La. Acts. No. 180, at 434.
19931
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remove it and restore the property to its prior condition. 24 The court
did not discuss the issue of whether defendant had other recourse,
namely, a claim against Onebane for his loss.
The fifth circuit also swayed away from the clear application of the
Civil Code articles (and in favor of unjust enrichment notions) in Berot
v. Norcondo Partnership.2 Prospective purchasers of a condominium
spent substantial funds to decorate and add improvements to the unit.
Ultimately, they failed to obtain financing, did not complete the pur-
chase, and sought compensation for their improvements. Involved were
drapes as well as "carpet, tile flooring, wallpaper, ceiling fans, and the
burglar alarm." 26 The items that were component parts under Louisiana
Civil Code articles 465-466 became owned by the owner of the con-
dominium. Under Article 495, the plaintiffs had the right to remove
those items, since they apparently were constructed with the consent of
the landowner. If not removed after demand, the owner could remove
them at the expense of the builders or elect to keep them, in which
case he would pay the current value of the materials. The case may be
explained by some kind of tacit indication that the owner wanted to
keep the items, thus invoking the obligation to pay the cost. However,
the court did not rely solely on that approach, probably because it
would not explain the requirement that the landowners compensate plain-
tiffs for the drapes, which normally would not be components. The
court instead relied on Article 1757's unjust enrichment principles and
Beacham.17
In any event, the courts of appeal appear to be splitting on these
matters of basic theory and jurisprudence. What happens when the
specification of a principle appears to conflict with the purpose and
policy behind the principle? In that regard, Professor Symeonides, writing
on a similar problem and the alternative solutions, has stated: "Hope-
fully, the preceding discussion has demonstrated that there are sufficient
analogous interpretations to choose from without resorting to unjust
enrichment. The preceding discussion may also have demonstrated that
none of the above solutions is fully satisfactory. If that is the case,
legislative correction is both necessary and desirable." ' 28 Perhaps one
24. This option in effect gives the builder the same status as a bad faith possessor.
25. 544 So. 2d 508 (La. App..Sth Cir. 1989); see also Orleans Onyx, Inc. v. Buchanan,
428 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) (noted in Thomas A. Harrell, Security Devices,
Developments in the Law, 1982-1983, 44 La. L. Rev. 535, 549 (1983) and Symeon
Symeonides, Property, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983, 44 La. L. Rev. 505, 526
n.128 (1983).
26. Berot, 544 So. 2d at 509-11.
27. Id. at 511.
28. See Symeonides, supra note 25, at 526.
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signpost here is the latest expression of the legislative will, the 1984
amendments to Article 493 which obviously veered from the notions of
unjust enrichment by providing that the landowner obtains ownership
of things without owing any compensation if the builder does not remove
them within ninety days after written demand.2 9
II. SERVITUDES
A. Servitudes by Destination
Establishment of servitudes by destination, since no agreement is
required, hinges primarily on the concept of notice-notice that a re-
lationship of service between tracts of land exists. It is the type of
notice that should be seen and appreciated by a reasonable purchaser
of the property.3 0 Only "apparent" servitudes may come into being by
destination solely by operation of law. Apparent servitudes are "per-
ceivable by exterior signs, works, or constructions; such as a roadway,
a window in a common wall, or an aqueduct.""2 But whether a particular
use gives such notice is not always simple. The inquiry is much like
Boyd Professor Wex Malone's description of the difficulties in the
concept of res ipsa loquitur-"Sure the thing speaks for itself, but what
does it say?"
The fourth circuit court of appeal gave the destination concept a
narrow construction and denied a claim for a servitude of passage in
730 Bienville Partners v. First National Bank of Commerce.12 Involved
was land occupied by a hotel, a garage, and a passageway between the
two. For many years, guests went from the hotel, through the passage,
into the garage and from there to the street. When ownership of the
garage tract was separated from the rest of the tract, the use of the
passage and garage continued pursuant to an agreement between the
hotel owners and the garage owners. When the hotel cancelled its agree-
ment and moved its parking operations elsewhere, the garage owners
sought to end the use by hotel guests of the garage as an exit to the
street. The hotel countered, claiming a servitude by destination.33 The
court of appeal held that such a servitude was not created.
The visible indications of a servitude arguably were a doorway from
the hotel to the garage; a sign on the wall reading "Entry to Hotel";
29. See Symeonides, supra note 13.
30. La. Civ. Code art. 741; Taylor v. Boulware, 35 La. Ann. 469 (1883).
31. La. Civ. Code art. 707. Nonapparent servitudes are also established by destination
if the owner records a document in the public records so indicating. La. Civ. Code art.
741. In that case, the public recordation constitutes the notice.
32. 596 So. 2d 836 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
33. Id. at 837-38.
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an illuminated sign above the door reading "The Saint Louis Hotel";
and a sign indicating the door was an entrance to the Louis XVI
Restaurant which is located in the hotel. The garage wall near the door
was painted to match the decor of the doorway. In the hotel were signs
stating "To Parking" and "Exit." '3 4 Of course, there was also the sight
of many people walking through the garage for many years, some parking
in the garage, some not. The court concluded that there was not enough
indication of a right of servitude of passage from the hotel through the
garage to the street.
The court is probably on solid ground, especially considering the
rule of construction that in case of doubt as to the establishment of a
servitude, the issue should be resolved in favor of the servient estate. 35
Here, there was obvious and regular use by persons, but it was use of
a public place where many of the users paid for parking and where
there was a long-standing contractual arrangement between the garage
and the hotel for such parking and entry into the hotel. The strongest
argument for the servitude would appear to be the doorway; but does
the existence of a door indicate a right to walk through a garage to a
street?
The court is on shakier ground when it focuses on the actual intent
of the parties and concludes there was no intent to establish a servitude.3 6
The important element is the degree of visible notice that a relationship
exists-enough that a reasonable person would be apprised that the
relationship will continue. In that objective inquiry it may be helpful
for some purposes to call the servitude the result of a "tacit agree-
ment."137 But the very fact of calling it tacit means there was no real
agreement, and the issue is not the subjective intent of the parties.
B. Encroachment Servitudes
If an encroacher is in "good faith," Louisiana Civil Code article
670 allows establishment of a servitude for a "building that encroaches
34. Id. at 839. The court also found it significant that "no exterior sign on the
garage ... directs foot or vehicular traffic from Iberville St. through the Garage .. "
Id. The fact situation is reminiscent of the photograph in the 1983 edition of Professor
Yiannopoulos' casebook in which a squatter purports to give notice of acquisitive pre-
scription claims by putting up a sign to that effect tacked onto a stake driven into the
ground. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law Property Casebook 381 (1983). Similarly, are these
signs an exterior sign, work or construction that would make the servitude perceivable
under Louisiana Civil Code article 707?
35. La. Civ. Code art. 730.
36. The court stated there was no proof that the former owners "intended to establish
a servitude of passage .. . no evidence to support the appellants' contention that the
Garage was intended as a path." 730 Bienville, 596 So. 2d at 840.
37. The court cites Professor Yiannopoulos for the proposition that the policy behind
servitudes by destination is a tacit agreement theory. Id. at 839.
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on an adjacent estate." The third circuit court of appeal gave the article
an expansive construction in Lakeside National Bank of Lake Charles
v. Moreaux,3 s applying it to "a septic tank with field lines" and "un-
derground air-conditioning system pipes." The court reasoned that com-
ponents of a building were included in the textual reference to buildings
and that the two systems in question were components of the building
under Louisiana Civil Code articles 465 and 466. Judge King dissented,
arguing that the servitude should not apply to nonapparent uses that
are not in fact buildings.39 His view would seemingly draw an analogy
to the laws on establishment of servitudes by destination and pre-
scription-some visible notice of the use of property would be required.
Indeed, if the thing constructed is visible there is reason for allowing
the servitude, even if the thing technically is not a building or a com-
ponent of a building. A satellite antenna, for example, may not be a
component of a house. Yet if the satellite antenna visibly encroaches
on the boundary, it would seem to be within the equitable policy premises
of Article 670, and more so than the underground lines involved in
Moreaux.
C. Roads and Streets-Three Year Maintenance
The facts of Moret v. Williams4 support the conclusion that a road
had not become public by three year maintenance under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 48:491. Despite some public maintenance of a road by
police jury workers, the first circuit court of appeal concluded the road
had not become public because the landowner had indicated opposition
to the maintenance and to the road becoming public. The landowners
embedded pipes across the roadway and felled a tree across the road
to block its use. The landowners had never requested the maintenance
and contacted the police jury to express objections to the maintenance.
Apparently, public work on the road was done to accommodate a tenant
living on neighboring land. 41
The conduct of the landowners in attempting to block use of the
road is quite similar to the facts of the early case of Elliott v. Police
Jury of Evangeline Parish,42 where the landowner repeatedly fenced his
property and intentionally felled trees in an attempt to block access to
the road. It was in Elliott that the court developed the view that the
three year maintenance must be peaceable and without coercion. Moret
38. 576 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
39. Id. at 1098-99 (King, J., dissenting).
40. 582 So. 2d 975 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
41. Id. at 976.
42. 15 La. App. 542, 132 So. 368 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931).
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is also akin to Town of Eunice v. Childs," where the landowner objected
to the city placing gravel on her alley by phoning and writing a letter
to the city attorney. There, the court stated that the statute was in-
applicable because the maintenance was not "peaceful or lawful," with
Judge Fruge citing Elliott as authority."
In light of those cases, Moret is quite traditional and ordinary. It
is true, as the court says, that an underlying rationale of the statute
(one that makes it constitutional) is that the landowner consents or
acquiesces in the maintenance. It is also true that the cases do not
require actual, subjective consent; rather, an objective standard is ap-
plied. The court acknowledges that "constructive knowledge" is enough
to infer acquiescence if the work is visible enough to alert a reasonable
landowner and the landowner does not protest. 45
But some of the court's language is questionable. It states that the
rationale underlying the rule is "protection of the public fisc, guarding
against the use of public monies for the benefit of private landowners.""
Sometimes, it is true that even though a landowner does not intend to
give the public any use rights at all-and even bars public use by never
permitting use of his road-the statute still applies by its terms. Three
year maintenance after request in Porter v. Huckaby47 was enough to
make the road public. In effect, the use of public funds to maintain a
private road was adequate justification for the state to take a right of
servitude from the private landowner without compensation.
However, it is to be remembered that the statute, until recent tin-
kering, never required any intent to dedicate or, indeed, any mental
state. It only focused on governmental conduct-maintenance for three
years. The problem with that simple approach is that it can border on
taking private property without due process. But not in a case like
Porter, where the reasonableness of the taking is the exchange of the
requested maintenance for the public rights that are exacted. But due
process concerns can be met in other ways, even when the landowner
does not subjectively consent to maintenance or to giving any rights of
public use. In Moret, even if the landowner never benefitted by using
the road (and it was the tenants next door who used the road and
asked for the maintenance), by its literal wording the statute would still
apply if the maintenance was significant, lasted for three years, and the
landowners did not object. It is not necessary, as the court seems to
imply, that the landowner benefit.
43. 205 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
44. Id. at 900.
45. Moret, 582 So. 2d at 977.
46. Id.
47. 221 La. 120, 58 So. 2d 731 (1952).
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Acquiescence or failure to object when a reasonable person knows
that some rights are being asserted on one's property over a reasonable
period of time is sufficient to make the taking of rights in accordance
with due process. This is the basic justification for acquisitive prescription
by noticeable acts of possession on another's property. It is the basic
justification for the notion of tacit dedication-consent to granting a
public right by toleration of the use for a long period. It is also the
basis for the three year prescription.
4 8
Recent amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:491 reflect these
basic concerns. It is now clearly stated that maintenance will make the
road public "if there is actual or constructive knowledge of such work
by adjoining landowners exercising reasonable concern over their prop-
erty." Consent is not necessary. 49 Actual knowledge is not necessary.
Actual notice is not necessary. "Constructive knowledge" is enough. In
other words, the type of maintenance that would be visible to a rea-
sonable person managing the property in a reasonable way is sufficient
to justify the state's taking a road without compensation.
D. Drainage Servitudes-Remedies
Gaharan v. State50 arose in an odd procedural setting that is unlikely
to arise again, but it contains troublesome dictum that may resurrect a
problem thought to be resolved in Poole v. Guste.1' In Poole, Justice
48. The supreme court in Frierson v. Police Jury of Caddo Parish, 107 So. 709 (La.
1926) stated:
Perhaps the statute would be unconstitutional if construed to mean that a private
road that had been kept up, maintained, or worked under authority of the
police jury for 3 years before the statute was enacted was converted into a
public road by virtue of the statute. We rest our decision in this case upon the
fact that the road was kept up and maintained by authority of the police jury
for a period exceeding 3 years subsequent to the enactment of the statute.
Id. at 711.
49. The court rejected the argument that a landowner must actually consent to the
dedication of the property in LeBoeuf v. Roux, 125 So. 2d 444 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960).
Judge Albert Tate wrote that since the landowner knew the disputed strip was maintained
for more than three years, "she cannot validly argue that her property was taken without
notice to her simply because of a present claim that she did not then know that the true
location of her western boundary included part of the roadway. . . ." Id. at 447. Accord
Lincoln Parish Police Jury v. Davis, 559 So. 2d 935 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990); Wise v.
Key, 445 So. 2d 98, 100 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), where the court stated, "But intent
of the landowner to dedicate the property as a street is unnecessary, if there is the
requisite maintenance without adequate protest. Tschirn v. Morse, 394 So. 2d 286 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1980); Town of Sorrento v. Templet, 255 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971); Winn Parish Police Jury v. Austin, 216 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968)."
50. 579 So. 2d 420 (La. 1991).
51. 262 So. 2d 339 (La. 1972). See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property § 299, at 579, in
2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d ed. 1991).
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Albert Tate suggested that "relegation of a landowner to compensatory
damages instead of to injunctive relief" when a servitude of drain was
involved would hardly ever be allowed. 2 That rule would seem to be
required by the substantive law, for Louisiana Civil Code article 655
states that the lower estate "is bound to receive the surface waters that
flow naturally." A literal reading of the text would require a court
order to receive the waters.53 As Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos pointed
out after Poole v. Guste was decided, Louisiana's "different civilian
procedural background" leads to the conclusion that injunctions should
be granted rather than damages.5
4
In Gaharan, Chief Justice Calogero suggested in dictum that an
injunction prohibiting interference with the servitude of drain was not
automatic: "In this case, upon remand, if the trial court finds that the
State is obstructing plaintiffs' natural servitude but that compelling
circumstances exist, it may fashion a reasonable alternative remedy to
mandating removal of the obstruction. Compensatory damages is one
possibility. '55
That language cannot be taken too seriously, however, for it comes
in the context of a case in which a claim for damages was prescribed
because of liberative prescription but the action for an injunction was
not. The court allowed the action for an injunction to proceed but not
the action for damages. However, the court then stated that in an
injunction action, an alternate remedy could be damages.5 6
52. Poole, 262 So. 2d at 345; accord Barr v. Smith, 598 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1992); Boxill v. Metrailer, 358 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978). But cf. Wood
v. Gibson Constr. Co., 313 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975). Judge Dennis wrote:
The record does not support a finding that, if the flooding of his property
recurs, the damage thereto will be so extensive that it cannot be adequately
measured and compensated by a money award, in the event it is determined
that defendant is legally responsible. Therefore, the injunction should not have
been issued.
Id. at 901. Also cf. Dyer & Moody Inc. v. Dynamic Constructors, Inc., 357 So. 2d 615
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) (injunction "harsh and impractical"; damages of $19,203 awarded,
an amount that would be "the cost of providing a facility that would be adequate to
accomplish what the natural drain used to accomplish on the adjoining property.") Id.
at 617.
53. Observe Louisiana Civil Code article 779, which provides that injunctions to
enforce building restrictions are to be issued "without regard to the limitations of Article
3601 of the Code of Civil Procedure." Thus, the injunctions are to be issued even if no
irreparable harm, injury or loss is involved.
54. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property, Work of Appellate Courts-1971-1972 Term, 33
La. L. Rev. 172, 175 (1973). In his treatise, he states, "Injunctive relief is available as
a matter of right without regard to the historical limitations developed by the chancery
court." A.N. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes § 21, at 72, in 4 Louisiana Civil Law
Treatise (1983).
55. Gaharan v. State, 579 So. 2d 420, 423 (La. 1991).
56. Id.
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It may also be impossible, because of the nature of court precedent,
for one court ever to authoritatively bind later judges to a rule that an
injunction will always issue in drainage cases. Even Justice Tate in Poole
had to state the rule in terms that an injunction would almost always
be issued and that only in very exceptional circumstances would an
alternate remedy be provided. A strict adherence to the civil code pro-
visions, however, would require injunctions.
In any event, it should still be clear that injunction is the preferred
remedy and that relegation to a damage remedy is available only in
exceptional circumstances. Indeed, the leading supreme court authority
for limiting relief to damages is Adams v. Town of Ruston" and Gaharan
v. State. Both cases involve governmental violators of the drainage
servitude. In Adams, the town drained swimming pool waters in violation
of its rights, and in Gaharan the State was allegedly blocking a natural
drain. In both cases, governmental violators were involved; it is important
to note that these violators were entities that could either expropriate
the land involved or obtain a servitude upon paying a price, even if an
injunction was issued. Relegation of the plaintiff to damages is perhaps
just a quicker and easier way of accomplishing the same result as an
expropriation but with less intrusion on private rights. That explanation
of Adams and Gaharan leaves the old case of Young v. International
Paper Co.5" as the only apparent case in which the state supreme court
used common law authorities to balance the equities and provide damages
instead of injunction in a case involving a private person violating a
drainage servitude. The result in Young of allowing chemical discharges
in a natural drain is very suspect now in light of pollution control
legislation. The extreme facts there also indicate the extent of the burden
required to justify that kind of balancing: "To enjoin defendant from
using the stream to take off its waste water, and thereby deprive it of
its only means of doing so, is virtually to close down mills costing
several millions of dollars to prevent some possible damage, of no
particular moment, on land, which has but slight value, save possibly
for mineral purposes." 59
III. CHANGES IN WATERBODIES-ACCRETION AND DERELICTION
Statutes designed to ameliorate the problems of changing shorelines
and uncertain shorelines that establish the boundaries between state and
private ownership are slowly developing.
The "freeze statute," Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1151, provides
that if ownership of land or water bottoms changes because of changes
57. 194 La. 403, 193 So. 688 (1940).
58. 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934).
59. Id. at 810, 155 So. at 233.
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in a waterbody, then-existing mineral leases remain in force. The rights
under the mineral leases remain in effect, including the right to royalties
from production. The supreme court suggested that the statute was
constitutional in State v. Placid Oil Co.,60 but the court's decision on
rehearing made that point moot. In Cities Service Oil and Gas Corp.
v. State,6' the second circuit court of appeal applied the statute to
ownership changes that occurred after the Red River changed its course.
The court also determined that the statute did not violate the consti-
tution .62
The statute violates neither the takings clause nor the clause pro-
hibiting the state from alienating its property. Nothing is taken from
the riparian landowner who has gained land by accretion if he obtains
the land without the mineral rights; he had no vested interest in the
land to begin with. "Article IX, Section 3 of the state constitution does
not prohibit the state, which obtains land by dereliction, from obtaining
less than full ownership, as no alienation or authorization of alienation
has occurred." 63
The False River boundary statute-Act 285 of 1975 and now Louis-
iana Revised Statutes 9:1110-raises more serious constitutional prob-
lems. The statute simply states that private landowners along the stream
own up to fifteen feet above mean sea level, at which point state
ownership begins; "[tihe boundary line formed at fifteen feet above
mean sea level marks the division between land owned by the State and
land owned by private persons along the banks of False River."
The statute can be applied constitutionally only if in 1975 the dividing
line between state and private ownership was in fact at that level. (If
False River is considered a lake, the line between state and private
ownership is the mean high water mark as of 1812; if it is a river or
stream, the line is the low water mark as of today or 1975). If the
actual line was higher than fifteen feet, the effect of the statute is to
transfer to private owners the property and mineral rights of the bed
of a navigable waterbody in violation of the Louisiana Constitution,
Article IX, Sections 3 and 4(A). If the actual line was lower than fifteen
feet, the statute was a taking of private property without compensation
in violation of the Louisiana Constitution, Article I, Section 4, as well
as the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution."
60. 300 So. 2d 154, 166 (La. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110, 95 S. Ct. 784
(1975).
61. 574 So. 2d 455 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
62. Id. at 461.
63. W. Lee Hargrave, "Statutory" and "Hortatory" Provisions of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 43 La. L. Rev. 647, 662 (1983).
64. It is also probably a violation of the local notice requirements imposed by the
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The constitutional argument was discussed offhandedly in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Lorio,61 The first circuit court of appeal simply said
that the statute did not violate Article IX, Section 4(A) since the actual
dividing line was higher than fifteen feet and thus there was no alienation
of the bed of a navigable waterbody. The court did not discuss whether
the statute was a taking without due process. This term, in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Aucoin," the court again did not discuss the consti-
tutional question, simply referring to "the fifteen feet traditionally used
after passage of LSA-R.S. 9:1110. " 67 The holding of the case was that
False River was not a lake in 1812, but a stream. The rules of accretion
and dereliction would thus apply to make changes in ownership as the
stream shrank over the years. 68
Even though the statute is unconstitutional insofar as it would change
the limits of state and private ownership in 1975, it might be construed
to be a freeze statute that would halt the application of the laws of
accretion and dereliction on False River after that date. If construed as
fixing a boundary when the constitution is not violated, the statute
would require that any accretions formed after 1975 above the fifteen
foot mark would remain the property of the State. One could also argue
that any dereliction occurring that would result in private owners losing
ownership of land below fifteen feet would be prohibited. Granted, such
a result would be contrary to the state's public policy69 against private
ownership of the beds of the navigable waterbodies, but that policy
would have to give way to the effect of a statute to the contrary,
especially since the statute would not appear to be in violation of the
constitution.7 0
Louisiana Constitution for local and special laws. La. Const. Art. Ill, § 13. Cf. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Lorio, 496 So. 2d 611, 616 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (dismissing the local
and special argument).
65. Chevron, 496 So. 2d at 615.
66. No. 91-CA-2270 (La. App. 1st Cir. Jun. 29, 1992).
67. Id. at 5.
68. La. Civ. Code art. 499.
69. Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1975); Miami Corp.
v. State, 173 So. 315 (La. 1937).
70. It would not be the alienation of the bed of a navigable waterbody because the
land in question is not yet part of the bed. It would be halting the acquisition of ownership
of such a bed.
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